In the foregoing two tables pitchers are included who did not reach a percentage of victories pitched in of .500; the list of these including Inks, Stratton, German, Hutchinson, Mullane, Parrott, Maul, Ehret, Daub, Mercer, Hawley and Westervelt, whose percentage figures were less than .500 and not lower than .400. Of those whose percentage figures did not reach .400 and were not lower than .300, were Stockdale, Menafee, Sullivan and A. Clarkson; while those who were less than .300 and not lower than .200, were McGill, Terry and Knell; Wadsworth being the tail-ender in percentage figures with .190. The above tables present quite an interesting pitching problem, the puzzle being to find out which of the above pitchers did the best work in the box in every respect, not only in pitching, but by his batting, fielding and base running. In percentage of victories pitched in, Meekin took the lead. In the number of batsmen struck out, Rusie excelled. In fewest bases on balls, Staley had the lowest figures. In base hit averages, Stivetts led; while in total sacrifice hits, Breitenstein bore off the palm. In total runs scored, Stivetts had the largest total. In stolen bases, Kennedy was the most successful, and yet he only stole 5 in 42 games. Now the problem is, Which pitcher did the best average work in his position? and we leave that for our readers to solve. It is alleged that the reason pitchers do so little in stealing bases is that they are too fatigued in their pitching in each inning to do much in the active work of base running, both duties trying a player's nerves considerably. For this reason it would be a good plan, in the order of batting, to have a sure hitter follow each pitcher, so as to help bat him round. Hints to the Pitchers of 1895. We are glad to record the fact that scientific pitching is advancing in the League arena. Its progress, hitherto, has been slow and only step by step, but it is making headway, and during 1894 the science of strategic pitching made greater progress than ever before. The effective blow given to "cyclone" pitching by the new pitching rules, which went into effect in 1893, while it did not materially affect the strategic class of pitchers--some of whom the new rules actually benefited--obliged the class of pitchers who depend solely upon their dangerous speed for success, to adopt strategic tactics to a more or less extent; and this is why a few of the old "cyclone" pitchers--as they are called--succeeded better than they anticipated under the change made in the rules in 1893, which had placed them farther from the batsman than in 1892.