Besides, _fifthly_, are tokens wanting in Scripture which disclose the nature of Peter's Primacy? Are there not effects which unfold the force and quality of the cause from which they spring? Such tokens there are in abundance, and such effects manifold. These are, the care with which Peter guarded the Apostolic college; the authority with which he visited Christians in every part; the singular exercise of judicial power, by which he established Church discipline, and provided for its maintenance; his acts of authoritative teaching; his drawing the form of laws which were to rule the universal Church; and, in short, the wonderful regard with which that Church followed Peter as its Head, and the Steward of all the Lord's family. What Primacy is it which these tokens set forth? What cause which these effects demonstrate? Is it one limited to a precedency of honour and order? or one pre-eminent by an inherent jurisdiction and authority? It is a point which needs no further words. For if any there be whose minds are not struck by a candid and sincere exposition of facts, you will in vain attempt to persuade them by arguments. Unless, indeed, _sixthly_, they allow themselves to be forced out of their prejudice by the Scriptures exhibiting such a Primacy of Peter as compels all others to profess one and the same faith with him, and to maintain one and the same society. For such an obligation could proceed neither from titles of honour, nor from precedency. It demanded a stronger cause--none other, in fact, but that supreme authority by which Peter is made head of all. But we shall feel much more at home in the truth of this deduction, if we enquire a little more deeply into the reasons for selecting one among the rest, namely Peter, and instituting the Primacy. For the purpose, and end proposed in a work, have the force of a _negative_ rule by which we may judge with certainty what ought to be done, or could not be left undone. I know well that it does not follow, if anything has been instituted for a certain purpose, that it ought to be endowed _only_ with those properties which appear necessary for the end to be gained; for it may be much more munificently established than the absolute need required. But at the same time I know that there would be a failure in prudence and wisdom in one who, desiring a certain work for a specific end, did not provide it with everything that could be deemed necessary. Thus the _knowledge of the intention and purpose_ is equivalent, if not to a _positive_ rule, determining all and singular the powers bestowed on any institution, at least to a _negative_, ascertaining what must be given to it, and what cannot be denied to it.