The acquittal in this case led to an appeal of murder, the most curious survival of the earliest English criminal procedure, which was not finally abolished till 1819. The effect of such a proceeding was that after an acquittal on an indictment for murder, the prosecutor might challenge the accused to an ordeal by battle. Accordingly, in the long vacation following the trial, Mrs. Stout, the mother of the dead woman, sued a writ of appeal out of Chancery, against Cowper, in the name of an infant who was her daughter's heir. The sealing of the writ was delayed, it is said to nearly the last possible day, a year after the alleged murder, for the purpose of keeping the matter in suspense as long as possible; and the consent of the mother of the infant to Mrs. Stout's being named as his guardian for the purpose, was obtained from her by a fraudulent representation that the object of the proceeding was to obtain the deceased woman's property for him. On discovering what its real effect was, she and her friends applied to one Toler, the under-sheriff of Hertfordshire, for the writ, and on his giving it up to them, burnt it. On a rule being obtained for the return of the writ, and it appearing that Toler had delivered it to the infant's mother, he was adjudged guilty of a gross contempt, and heavily fined. Holt, Lord Chief-Justice, said on this occasion that he wondered that it should be said that an appeal is an odious prosecution. He said he esteemed it a noble remedy, and a badge of the rights and liberties of an Englishman. The court of king's bench, to show their resentment, committed Toler to the prison of the king's bench for his fine, though the clerk in court would have undertaken to pay it. And Holt, chief-justice, said to Toler, that he had not been in prison long enough before, and that he might now, if he pleased, go to Hertford and make his boast that he had got the better of the king's bench. Afterwards Mrs. Stout petitioned the Lord Keeper for another writ; the infant and his mother presenting a counter-petition disowning their former writ as sued forth without their consent. After an argument before a full court it was decided that the Court had power to grant a new writ, but that it would be unjust to grant one under the present circumstances, because, among other reasons, the appellant and his mother had renounced the writ as soon as they understood its nature, and there was no proof that the appellees had been privy to their action. FOOTNOTES: