Æsthetic as science of expression and general linguisticCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Æsthetic as science of expression and general linguistic
Croce, Benedetto
Aesthetics; Language and languages -- Philosophy; Philosophy
γένοιτο), and differs from science, because, although it regards the
universal and not the particular (τα καθ' εκαστον) like history,
it does not regard it in the same way as science, but in a certain
measure, which the philosopher indicates by the word _rather_ (μαλλον
τα καθόλου). The point then is to establish the precise meaning of
the _possible,_ the _rather_ and the _historical particular._ But no
sooner does Aristotle attempt to determine the meaning of these words,
than he falls into contradictions and fallacies. That _universal_ of
poetry, which is the _possible,_ seems to identify itself for him with
the probable or the necessary (τα _κατά το είκος η το άναγκαΐον_),
and the particular of history is not explained at all, except by
giving instances: "that which Alcibiades did and what happened to
him."[32] Aristotle, in fact, after having made so good a beginning
in the discovery of the purely imaginative, proper to poetry, remains
half-way, perplexed and uncertain. Thus he sometimes makes the truth
of imitation consist in a certain learning and syllogizing that takes
place when we look at imitations, by which we recognize that "this is
that," that a copy answers to the original;[33] or, worse, he loses the
grains of truth that he has found and forgets that poetry has for its
content the possible, admitting, not only that it may also depict the
_impossible_ (το αδύνατον), and even the _absurd_ (το άτοπον), seeing
that both are _credible_ and that they do not injure the end of art,
but even that we must prefer impossible probabilities to incredible
possibilities.[34] Art, since it has to do even with the impossible
and absurd, will not therefore have in it anything of the rational,
but in accordance with the Platonic theory it will be an imitation of
the appearance in which empty sense indulges itself; that is to say, a
thing of pleasure. Aristotle does not attain to this result, because
he does not attain to any clear and precise result in this part of the
subject, but it is one of the results that can be deduced from what he
has said, or that, at any rate he is not able to exclude. This means
that he did not fulfil his tacitly assumed task, and that although
he re-examined the problem with marvellous acuteness after Plato, he
failed truly to rid himself of the Platonic definition, by substituting
a firmly-established one of his own.
[Sidenote: _The concepts of imitation and of imagination after A
ristotle. Philostratus._]
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