Greece -- History -- Peloponnesian War, 431-404 B.C. -- Fiction
spread like wildfire through the city: Gylippus was coming, armed with
full authority from Sparta--Corinth had taken up their cause--Syracuse
was saved! All thought of surrender was instantly flung away, and news
arriving shortly afterwards that Gylippus was near at hand, the whole
Syracusan force marched out to meet him, and escorted him triumphantly
into the town.
Thus, without a blow being struck, an immense access of strength had
been brought to the besieged, and the grand condition of successful
resistance, on which Alcibiades had laid such weight, was fulfilled. A
Spartan officer of consummate ability was now in Syracuse, and he had
made his way into the city, not alone, not by stealth, but at the head
of an army, and before the very eyes of the enemy. Weeks must have
elapsed between the departure of Gylippus from Leucas, and his arrival
at Syracuse; and during all this time, with one trifling exception,
Nicias made no effort to oppose his progress. Prudent men might well
have regarded the enterprise of Gylippus as a wild and desperate
adventure; and such it must have proved, but for the astounding
blindness and apathy of Nicias.
At the time when Gylippus reached Syracuse the Athenian lines of
circumvallation were all but completed on the side of the Great
Harbour; but a wide interval was still left between the Circle and the
northern sea, and it was here that Gylippus had effected an entrance.
To keep this space open was a matter of supreme importance, and the
scene of action is now shifted again to the northern slope of Epipolae.
On the day after his arrival Gylippus succeeded in capturing the
Athenian fort at Labdalum, and the command of this position gave
increased facilities for the construction of a third counterwall, which
was forthwith taken in hand, and carried in the direction of Labdalum,
until it crossed the blockading line at its northern end.
If the Syracusans succeeded in completing and holding this counterwork,
the blockade of Syracuse would be rendered impossible. Yet for some
time Nicias made no attempt to interrupt its progress. As if already
convinced of his inferiority in the field, he took steps to keep his
communications open by sea, and with this object he employed a part of
his forces in fortifying the headland of Plemmyrium, which commanded
the entrance to the Great Harbour. Here he built three forts which
served as an arsenal for the Athenian stores; and henceforth Plemmyrium
became the chief station for his fleet. This removal had a disastrous
effect on the Athenian crews; for the place being almost a desert, and
the springs distant and scanty, they were compelled to go far from
their quarters in search of forage and water, and while thus engaged
they were cut off in great numbers by the Syracusan horse, who had been
posted at Polichne for this purpose. A rapid demoralization of the
crews was the consequence, and desertions became more frequent every
day.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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