Story of the War in South Africa, 1899-1900Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Story of the War in South Africa, 1899-1900
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
South African War, 1899-1902
any attempt on the part of the enemy to rush it suddenly.
When the ultimatum expired, October 11, the garrison proper consisted
of 570 Imperial and 630 colonial troops, for the defence of an
unwalled town which contained 40,000 inhabitants and, being built in
rambling fashion, had a very long circuit--about eleven miles--to be
guarded. The ready co-operation of the citizens in military duty, both
those already belonging to volunteer bodies and those not previously
organised, but now enrolling themselves for the purpose, alone made
the defence possible. From them, particularly, was formed a corps of
irregular horse, which filled the want of mounted troops that at first
was severely felt. Colonel Kekewich, recognising the enemy's
overpowering superiority of numbers, rapidly drew {p.139} into
Kimberley all the outlying forces of every character under his
command.
Although deeply concerned for the safety of the Modder River bridge,
upon which in a measure would depend the advance of a relief column,
"I was most anxious," he says, "that no disposition of troops made by
me should give the enemy a chance of scoring a first success, even
where the smallest body of British troops might be concerned. Taking
into consideration that the enemy would probably not regulate his
movements in accordance with the dictates of sound strategy, that he
was in possession of mobile artillery in my immediate neighbourhood, I
felt that if I had detached a small body of troops, necessarily
without artillery, which it was not in my power to support from
Kimberley, the enemy would in all probability concentrate very
superior numbers, with artillery, against the small British post, and
endeavour to destroy the troops composing the same. It was principally
for this reason that I determined to concentrate all my available
forces, including the Cape Police, at the point of greatest importance
in my command--Kimberley."
The {p.140} inference of Colonel Kekewich as to the Boers' strategy
was as accurate as his general action was militarily judicious. The
concentration and development of his resources not merely deterred the
enemy from assault, but detained them there in force, to the neglect
of matters elsewhere much more urgently worthy of their efforts. The
gain of Kimberley, had they gained it, would have been poor
compensation for the daily increasing solidity of the still weak
British grasp on the central positions outlined by De Aar, Orange
River and Naauwport. This absorption of the Boers' attention by
Kimberley was maintained by frequent sorties of the garrison, in every
direction, which at an early period of the siege became possible
through the ready facility with which the citizens were converted into
irregular mounted troops. "It will be observed," wrote Kekewich, "that
portions of the mounted corps were employed on every occasion" of the
continued sallies in greater or less force, especially at the period
of Methuen's advance.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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