It is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon the general
principle of recent "functional" psychology, that practical ends are the
controlling factors in the acquisition of our knowledge of objective
things. We shall take for granted the truth of the general proposition
that cognition, in whatever sphere of science or of practical life, is
essentially teleological in the sense of being incidental always, more
or less directly, to the attainment of ends. Cognition, as the
apperceptive or attentive process, is essentially the process of
scrutinizing a situation (whether theoretical or practical) with a view
to determining the availability for one's intended purpose of such
objects and conditions as the situation may present. The objects and
conditions thus determined will be made use of or ignored, counted upon
as advantageous or guarded against as unfavorable--in a word, responded
to--in ways suggested by their character as ascertained through
reference to the interest in question. In this sense, then, objective
things as known by individual persons are essentially complex stimuli
whose proper function and reason for being it is to elicit useful
responses in the way of conduct--responses conducive to the realization
of ends.
From this point of view, then, the difference between one person's
knowledge of a particular object and another's signifies (1) a
difference between these persons' original purposes in setting out to
gain knowledge of the object, and (2) consequently a difference between
their present ways of acting with reference to the object. The bare
object as socially current is, at best, for each individual simply a
ground upon which subsequent construction may be made; and the
subsequent construction which each individual is prompted by his
circumstances and is able to work out in judgment first makes the
object, for this individual, real and for his purposes complete.
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