[2] See ANGELL, "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," _The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_, Vol. III (1903), Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72. [3] See _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20. [4] See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in _The Child and the Curriculum_, pp. 28, 29. [5] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the preceding exposition see Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4. [6] LOTZE, _Logic_, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7. [7] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25. [8] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 36. [9] _Ibid._ [10] _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4. [11] _Logic_, Vol. II, p. 235; see the whole discussion, §§ 325 through 327. [12] The emphasis here is upon the term "existences," and in its plural form. Doubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me, as mine in a peculiarly intimate way, from others as chiefly concerning other persons, or as having to do with things, is an early one. But this is a distinction of _concern_, of value. The distinction referred to above is that of making an _object_, or presentation, out of this felt type of value, and thereby breaking it up into distinct "events," etc., with their own laws of inner connection. This is the work of psychological analysis. Upon the whole matter of the psychical I am glad to refer to PROFESSOR GEORGE H. MEAD'S article entitled "The Definition of the Psychical," Vol. III, Part II, of _The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_. [13] We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this point of view in PROFESSOR HENRY JONES, _Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895. My specific criticisms agree in the main with his, and I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness. But I cannot agree in the belief that the business of thought is to qualify reality as such; its occupation appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or portion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself; being, indeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot agree that reality as such, with increasing fulness of knowledge, presents itself as a thought-system, though, as just indicated, I have no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifications or values, just as it does as affectional and æsthetic and the rest of them. [14] Bradley's criticisms of rationalistic idealism should have made the force of this point reasonably familiar. [15] The common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions, emotions, etc., into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the truth that "objects," etc., have only gradually emerged from their life-matrix. Looking back, it is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy of supposing that somehow such objects were there first and were afterward emotionally appreciated.