The bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment cannot be discussed here. [27] See Vol. I, pp. 38, 59, 61, 105, 129, 197, for Lotze's treatment of these distinctions. [28] Vol. I, p. 36; see also Vol. II, pp. 290, 291. [29] Vol. II, p. 246; the same is reiterated in Vol. II, p. 250, where the question of origin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain psychical acts are necessary as "conditions and occasions" of logical operations, but the "deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought remains unfilled." [30] _Philosophy of Lotze_, chap. 3, "Thought and the Preliminary Process of Experience." [31] Vol. I, p. 38. [32] Vol. I, p. 13; last italics mine. [33] Vol. I, p. 14; italics mine. [34] See Vol. I, pp. 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not only the first, but the most indispensable of all thought's operations. [35] Vol. I, p. 26. [36] Vol. I, p. 35. [37] Vol. I, p. 36; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 30. What if this canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above: the original objectification which transforms the mere state into an abiding quality or meaning? Suppose, that is, it were said that the first objectifying act cannot make a substantial (or attached) quale out of a mere state of feeling; it must _find_ the distinction it makes there already! It is clear we should at once get a _regressus ad infinitum_. We here find Lotze face to face with this fundamental dilemma: thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions, or else just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or futile. This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impression, has already been discussed. See p. 31. [38] Vol. I, p. 31. [39] As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is always a factor or status in a reflective situation; it is always a predicate of judgment, in use in interpreting and developing the logical subject, or datum of perception. See Study VII, on the Hypothesis. [40] ROYCE, in his _World and Individual_, Vol. I, chaps. 6 and 7, has criticised the conception of meaning as valid, but in a way which implies that there is a difference between validity and reality, in the sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real only when it is experienced in direct feeling. The above implies, of course, a difference between validity and reality, but finds the test of validity in exercise of the function of direction or control to which the idea makes pretension or claim. The same point of view would profoundly modify Royce's interpretation of what he terms "inner" and "outer" meaning. See MOORE, _The University of Chicago Decennial Publications_, Vol. III, on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality."