The function of hate is, like anger, to injure and eliminate the injurious; but what anger accomplishes by a sudden volcanic outburst, hate accomplishes in a slower, but surer and more subtle way. Hate is, as previously pointed out, a manifest improvement over anger as a method of offensive warfare. Other things being equal, the best hater is the most successful individual. Dr. Johnson had reason on his side when he said that he loved a good hater. A strong hater, who pertinaciously assails and injures his enemies, strengthens his own position and makes the largest place for himself in life. Hate, as a permanent, economically aggressive motion, marks certainly a great advance, and is of the highest import for life. If now hate has its own function as direct stimulus to offensive action toward those who will be injurious, toward those who are capable and likely to pain and harm us, how shall we explain the hate—and we might say anger as well—which arises at mere remembrance of injury, and which seems to have no immediate value for life? In the first place we may well doubt whether any purely retrospective emotion exists, at least in early psychic life. The past, of course, has no value in and by itself; it is irretrievable, and emotional force spent upon it as such wasted—“no use crying for spilled milk.” It may well be that for simple psychisms the past never exists as such; at least, it is never a stopping point, but a mere _datum_ for interpreting the inexperienceable. The sense of experience, especially in its temporal aspect, is very difficult of analysis; yet we may say with some confidence that at first it does not imply a sense of either the past or future as such. The mind is immediately impressed by the injuriousness of the injurious, which, though coming, of course, in terms of the experienced, is not relegated thereby to a past time, nor is it at all dwelt upon as such for emotion reaction. Primitive emotion is not backward looking; for this is in itself entirely futile, and primitive life depends for its existence and progress upon utility. The value of emotion is in stimulating preparedness for defence and offence. The representation of injury inflicted comes up to early mind as some injury being inflicted, or imminently so, or is applied at once in interpretation of the experienceable, with no thought or emotion for it as merely past fact. Advanced psychic life may stop at the first step, may indulge in retrospection for its own sake, and not for its immediate value in understanding the experienceable, but primitive emotion is ever an alertness and anticipatory readiness. If, now, we turn to some classification of the anger group in itself and in its general relation to emotion, we obtain something like the following:—