The moving factors, the active agents in the evolution of consciousness, are not, I think, sense-impressions of any kind; these are the results, rather than the incentives, of mental evolutions. Mind acquires its whole sense outfit, and receives no cognition whatever ready-made. It is hard, indeed, for us to put ourselves at the point of view of acquirement of what seem to us simple impressions of sense; but the difficulty is only of the same general nature as to understand how what seem to be direct perceptions of things in space are really indirect. The progress of psychology will, in my opinion, tend to show more and more that _givens_ of all kinds are such in appearance only, and that mind in its essence is purely a feeling-effort. The differentiation of action secured through sensation and its differentiations is evidently of the utmost importance to life, but still the objectivity secured is small. In the pure feeling stage, reaction is a very hit-and-miss affair, and in pure sensation stage it is but little better. Guided only by present sensations, the organism in the struggle for existence is blind to all objects, and, knowing not itself nor other objects, anticipatory action is entirely beyond its power. The growth of mind is to secure delicacy and precision of adjustment with largest time and space extension, and the achievement of objectification was a _tour de force_ of the highest value. The exigencies of life-struggle lead comparatively early from cognition of mode of affection to the cognition of thing affecting. Perception arises to supplement sensation, and full objectification opens the way for intelligent activities. Thing or object is first, no doubt, apprehended tactually; but the sense of touch is, of course, acquired before cognition of thing touched. We, indeed, find it difficult to appreciate this, since in touch we constantly apprehend things as in contact with us; still, if in some very sluggish state, as deep sleep, when the varied and correlated life of sensation with perception is practically _nil_, a rough object be made to bear upon the body as a lump in the mattress, it is evident that consciousness begins as bare pain, then general uneasiness as bare general sensation, then sense of touch, and finally cognition of object by means of and through the touch sensation. The sense of thing touched follows on sense of touch. This general order may be illustrated from a squib in a comic paper of the day. A swell finding a friend sitting by an open window on a cold day asks him if he does not feel cold. He answers, “Ya-as; I guess I do. I knew theah was something the mattah with me; I suppose it must be cold.” The threefold movement in this noodle’s mind as evidenced by his words, is, first, feeling pain; second, a something the matter, _i.e._, general sensing and objectifying thereupon; third, particularizing to feeling cold. He has simply gone back to primitive process. Touch or other sensation is