native function it belongs to a general biologic problem. As to the question as to whether cognition or what cognitions are original and simple in all mind, we have already excluded the whole field of cognition from this position. Does the general objectification, the first stage in cognition of object, have any special function for the developed presentation forms of later consciousness? Mr. Ward, in his suggestive article in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_, seems to intimate that it has. He says (p. 50), "Actual presentation consists in this _continuum_ being differentiated and every differentiation constitutes a new presentation.“ Mr. Ward in this connection sets forth that presentation-continuity in consciousness is determined by a presentation-continuum which is ”_totum objectivum_." Presentation activity is fundamentally a differentiating of this constant element. We might compare this _continuum_ to an ocean from whose surface rise waves, particular presentations, which subside again into the parent sea, which ever remains as the constant basis of all wave movements. Now the question of _continua_ is a very broad one. Do the early stages of consciousness, pure feeling, pure sensation, pure objectivity, remain as constituting the basic bulk of all higher consciousness, and is all higher consciousness but differentiation of these as well as from these, that is, is it no more than differentiating activity kept up on a vast series of levels and sub-levels? Or are we to regard them as regressive stages to which developed consciousness rarely returns? May we consider that there is a certain histology of mind, that certain primitive forms, like tissues in the body, constitute the inner and constant structure of mind? The theory of _continua_, be it observed, in its fulness requires a numberless series of levels and sub-levels supporting one another, for a high form of consciousness pre-supposes an indefinite series of antecedent stages. While any highly differentiated consciousness is going on it must be an actual differentiating of the preceding stage, which is therefore coincident and pre-existent to it, and this latter in turn must have its supporting continuum, and so on down _ad infinitum_. The theory makes mind a wheel within wheel of bewildering intricacy. Yet mind in this point of view has a certain analogy with the physiological status of the higher organisms, for example, the human body is colonial, is constituted of a multitude of cells, a simple type of organisms, by whose consentaneous activity the whole body is animate. One objection to this theory is that it confounds functioning with differentiating. Not every act of consciousness is by its very nature a differentiating, a movement toward specialization. Consciousness is on the whole more often regressive than progressive, and very often practically neither, as for example, in all instinctive, habitual, and spontaneous activities.