It should be observed further that this same assumption is implied in the fundamental ‘laws of thought’ on which the traditional logic rests. Indeed, the notorious ‘Law of Identity’ seems to be merely another statement of it. It is usually formulated as ‘_A is A_’, but in its actual logical use it is really the assumption that ‘everything _is_ what it is called’. It is, of course, anything but self-evident that ‘_A_’ _is A_, but _unless_ the _S_, _M_, and _P_ of the syllogism are _rightly_ so called, the syllogism will not hold. Similarly, the Law of Contradiction collapses at once if the terms to which it is applied are allowed to change. The inability of ‘_A_’ both to be _B_ and not to be _B_ vanishes if ‘_A_’ is not fixed and may change its habits. And of course the real things known to science all change, and are fixed only by a fiction. Hence every application of the logical convention to real things may be challenged: it involves a fiction and takes a risk, and both of these may be bad. But the traditional logic ignores both the risk and the fiction and the lack of cogency in its attitude. § 8. (2) It is a further presupposition of the syllogism that the meaning of its terms is _known_. When a discussion is begun the parties to it are supposed to understand each other, and not to have first to find out and form the meaning of the terms they use. This assumption also is roughly true in ordinary debate, and its convenience is manifest. If things are rightly named, and if this feat has been accomplished once for all--presumably by Adam and Eve before they were turned out of Paradise for trying to know too much--we shall escape many of the most trying difficulties of scientific inquiry. We need no longer trouble whether the best names have been given, and whether a name good for one purpose is equally good for another, nor need we inquire whether our names may not unite what is alien on account of a superficial likeness, or separate what is akin on account of a superficial difference.