Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 1 (of 2)
Religion
Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 1 (of 2)
Medicine -- History; Science -- History
Of course it was covertly assumed that certainty could only be reached
by _starting_ from certainty, and that no possibility of a growth of
assurance in the progress of the reasoning could be entertained. In a
sense this assumption was correct (cf. §§ 27, 28), because it is true
that the gradual verification of scientific truths does not render them
absolute; but it led to neglect of all methods which appeared to start
with premisses initially doubtful and hardening into certainties by
gradual confirmation. No doubt it was not strictly impossible to reason
from premisses not known to be true, but such reasoning was despised
as ‘dialectical’, and no inquiry was made into the frequency of its
occurrence in actual science. Why, then, waste time upon so unworthy
a procedure, instead of fixing one’s whole attention upon the truly
logical ideal, the absolute proof of absolute truth? Let us maintain,
rather, the old Aristotelian[384] conviction that the truly scientific
syllogism proceeds from premisses that are true and underivative
(because ‘self-evident’) and inerrant, and demonstrates its conclusion
with ineluctable necessity! Thus the attainment of _absolute truth_
was unobtrusively smuggled in as the aim of reasoning, and became an
integral feature of the ideal of ‘demonstration’.
§ 11. From the standpoint of the scientific inquirer, however, this
whole theory of proof is open to the gravest objections. He finds
first that it is impracticable, being composed throughout of counsels
of perfection with which he cannot comply, and then that, even if he
could, they would be perfectly useless, and destructive of his aims.
(1) It strikes him at once that the Fixity of Terms is an obvious
_fiction_. He will of course be aware, from his scientific experience,
that fictions have their uses and are often indispensable; but he will
know also that not all fictions are useful, and that the adoption of a
fiction has in each case to be justified by its usefulness. Moreover,
it is not so much its immediate and prospective use which justifies it,
though this yields the usual motive for its adoption, as the ulterior
uses ascertained _ex post facto_ by experience.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account