Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 1 (of 2)
Religion
Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 1 (of 2)
Medicine -- History; Science -- History
Other topics which are ‘logical’, because they concern the general
significance of scientific procedure and not the solution of particular
problems, are the nature and importance of selecting ‘facts’ and
the ‘laws’ they are taken to exemplify, the experimental attitude
and the framing of hypotheses, the evaluation of probabilities and
alternatives, the estimation of relevance and of verifications and of
the amounts of the latter which are requisite and the sorts of it which
are relevant. On all these points logic has hitherto had little or
nothing to say, mainly because they did not lend themselves to formal
treatment. Lastly, there are two extremely important subjects, which
are so vital to the logic of discovery that a brief discussion of them
may fitly conclude this essay. We may call them the problem of Novelty
and the problem of Risk.
§ 36. In Logic we are not concerned with the metaphysics of Novelty,
i.e. with the problem of whether there ever enter the world things
that are really and truly unforeseen and unpredictable, that pop into
it from nowhere, and if so, whether and how we can understand such
things. This problem is deep and difficult, and so, until recently,
philosophers have fought shy of it, and used to settle it off-hand by
a flat denial that such things could be in a ‘rational’ universe. But
now that M. Bergson has given us a radically new metaphysic, and that
we are beginning to perceive that the principles used to dispose of the
matter, viz. causality and the conservation of energy, are essentially
methodological, the question has become an open one.
Logic, however, has no need to probe it; it can treat it more simply.
For its purposes it can, and must, treat novelty as a real logical
fact. It is a psychological fact, and logic must note it, that every
moment of our life has for us a certain flavour of newness; it is
also a fact that every real judgement that is ever made has a certain
relation to novelty.[403] Its maker believes, either that it embodies
a new truth, or that though known to him it is new to his hearers. If
he did not believe this he would have no motive to make it. It would
be stale repetition, devoid of interest or value alike to him and to
others, whom he would merely bore by telling them what they, too, knew
already.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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