which divert the development of the progenitors, and on the other side
upon those which divert the individual itself from its course, _i.e._
from the developmental direction transmitted hereditarily. Although
I thus essentially agree with Darwin and Haeckel in so far as these
authors refer the “universal individual dissimilarity” to dissimilar
external actions, I differ from Darwin in this, that I do not see an
essential distinction between the direct and indirect production of
individual differences, if by the latter is meant only the unequal
influencing of the germ in the parental organism. Haeckel is certainly
correct in referring the “primitive differences of the germs produced
by the parents” to the inequalities of nutrition to which the single
germs must inevitably have been exposed in the parent organism;
but another dissimilarity of the germs must evidently be added--a
dissimilarity which has nothing to do with unequal nutrition, but
which depends upon unequal inheritance of the individual differences
of the ancestors, a source of dissimilarity which must arise to a
greater extent in sexual than in asexual reproduction. Just as in
sexual propagation there occurs a blending of the characters (or
more precisely, developmental directions) of two _contemporaneous
individuals_ in _one_ germ, so in every mode of reproduction there meet
together in the same germ the characters of a whole _succession of
individuals_ (the ancestral series), of which the most remote certainly
make themselves but seldom felt in a marked degree.
The fact of individual variability can in this way be well understood;
the living organism contains in itself no principle of variability--it
is the _statical element_ in the developmental processes of the
organic world, and would always reproduce exact copies of itself if the
inequality of the external influences did not affect the developmental
course of each new individual; these influences are therefore the
_dynamical elements_ of the process.
From this conception of variability two important empirically
established facts can be theoretically deduced, viz. the limitability
of variation with respect to quality, which has already been previously
mentioned, and the origination of transformations by the direct action
of external conditions of life.
If the differences in individuals of the same origin depend upon
the action of unequal influences, variation itself is nothing else
than the reaction of the organism to a definite external inciting
cause, the quality of the variation being determined by the quality
of the inciting cause and by that of the organism. In the cases of
individual variation hitherto considered, the quality of the organism
is equal but that of the inciting cause is unequal, and in this way
there arise minute differences in organisms of an equal physical
constitution--variations of a different quality.
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