move it are not designedly regulated--the more immense because it is not a single motion of projection that acts here, but a large number of heterogeneous powers, _i.e._ a large number of variously acting necessities which are, as a whole, devoid of purpose, but which nevertheless accomplish this purpose, not only at any single moment, but constantly. A truly admirable series of desirable accidents!”[305] The same idea is expressed, although in a very different manner, by Von Hartmann, in the concluding chapter of his work already quoted. He thinks that “design is a necessary and certain consequence of the mechanical laws of nature.” “Were the mechanism of natural laws not teleological there would be no mechanically regulated laws, but a weak chaos of obstinate and capricious powers. Not until the causality of the laws of inorganic nature had superseded the expression “dead” nature, and had shown itself as the mainspring of life and of a conformability to design visible on all sides, did it deserve the name of mechanical lawfulness; just as a complication of wheels and machinery made by man, which move in some definite manner with respect to one another, only acquires the name of a mechanism or of a machine when the immanent teleology of the combination and of the various movements of the parts is revealed.”[306] Against the correctness of the idea underlying these statements scarcely anything can in my opinion be said. The harmony of the universe and of that portion of it which we designate organic nature, cannot be explained by chance, _i.e._ without a common ground for co-operating necessities; by the side of mere mechanism it is impossible not to acknowledge a teleological principle--the only question is, in what manner can we conceive this as acting without abandoning the purely mechanical conception of nature? This is obviously effected if, with Von Baer and Von Hartmann, we permit the metaphysical principle to interrupt the course of the mechanism of nature, and if we consider both the former and the latter to work together with equal power. Von Hartmann expressly makes such an admission under the name of an “internal principle of development,” to which he attributes such an important share that one cannot understand why it should have any need for the employment of causal powers, and why it does not simply do everything itself. Von Baer expresses himself much less decisively, and even in many places insists upon the purely mechanical connection of organic natural phenomena; but that with him also the idea of interruption by a metaphysical principle is present, is principally shown by his assuming, at least partly, the _per saltum_ development of species. This necessarily involves an actively internal power of development.