Just now the former party is in the ascendant. M. de Lanessan has contrasted the short range of the torpedo with the long range of the gun, and has deduced from the conditions the necessity for two classes of vessels (_a_) torpedo craft, and (_b_) battleships and armoured cruisers. He has explained that in order that the gun should be given its full value it is essential that the platform should be stable and that a vessel of considerable dimensions was thus called for. It was impossible upon such a platform to place many powerful guns, but a necessary consequence was that these should be protected, and hence came the need of heavy armouring. In short, the two qualities of offence and defence were indissoluble, but they were not the only qualities called for; speed and range in action were also necessary, and these again led inevitably to the heavy battleship. M. Fleury-Ravarin, commenting on the fact that many advocates of the _guerre de course_ had asked if there did not exist a more economical means of making war than that which consisted in opposing to certain ships others of a like character, told the French Parliament that it (the _guerre de course_) had never brought an enemy to submission, and that in the existing conditions of naval warfare it was very costly, whilst speed, its essential element, was of all elements at sea the most elusive. Moreover, the organisation of the _guerre de course_ required many naval bases so that not only was it more costly in the beginning, but it demanded greater charges for maintenance. For these reasons this system of warfare could not be raised to a method; it must remain an accessory. There can be no doubt that the popularity of the submarine craft with ministers, writers, journalists, and populace is due very largely to the idea that these vessels will in warfare prove capable of meeting and defeating the battleships and cruisers which Great Britain will send against France when the “Real Thing” arrives. A writer who adopts the _nom de plume_ of “_Armour_” points out the probable course of action in a naval war between France and Great Britain. British squadrons would be deprived of value by giving them no object to attack and preventing the possibility of establishing an effective blockade. The French ships would be withdrawn to the forts, which would be strongly fortified so as to secure them against attack. The close watching of a port would be too dangerous to be undertaken, and at night the squadrons would be obliged to withdraw to great distances in order to escape the menaces of the submersible boats: and at the same time the ingress and egress of cruisers—the only large vessels that would put to sea—would be easy.