By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. Thus Tu Yu: 因厚賂重許反使爲我間也. On the other hand, 蕭世諴 Hsiao Shih-hsien in defining the 反間 says that we pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on (敵使人來候我我佯不知而示以虛事). Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ 21 _sqq._). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success: 1) by T‘ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see _supra_, p. 90); 2) by Chao Shê on his march to O-yü (see p. 57); and by the wily 范雎 Fan Chü in 260 B.C., when Lien P‘o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch‘in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P‘o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chü’s pay. They said: “The only thing which causes Ch‘in anxiety is lest 趙括 Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P‘o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long run.” Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao Shê. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman 藺相如 Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P‘o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch‘i and the great military power of Ch‘in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword. [See 歷代紀事年表, ch. 19, ff. 48–50]. 12. 死間者爲誑事於外令吾間知之而傳於敵 Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.