The ground upon which Mr. Mill admits that a miracle may not be contradictory to complete induction is that it is not an assertion that a certain cause was not followed by a certain effect, but an allegation of the interference of an adequate counteracting cause. This does not, however, by his own showing, remove a miracle from the action of Hume's principle, but simply modifies the nature of the antecedent improbability. Mr. Mill qualifies his admission regarding the effect of the alleged counteracting cause, by the all-important words "if present;" for, in order to be valid, the reality of the alleged counteracting cause must be established, which is impossible, therefore the allegations fall to the ground. No one knows better than Mr. Mill that the assertion of a Personal Deity working miracles, upon which a miracle is allowed for a moment to come into court, cannot be proved, and, therefore, that it cannot stand in opposition to complete induction which Hume takes as his standard. In admitting that Hume has made out, that no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who does not previously believe in a being of supernatural power willing to work miracles, Mr. Mill concedes everything to Hume, for his only limitation is based upon a supposition of mere personal belief in something which is not capable of proof, and which belief, therefore, is not {87} more valid than any other purely imaginary hypothesis. The belief may seem substantial to the individual entertaining it, but, not being capable of proof, it cannot have weight with others, or in any way affect the Value of evidence in the abstract. That mere individual belief, apart from proof, should thus be advanced in limitation of a logical principle, seems to us most unwarranted, and at the most it can only be received as a statement of what practically takes place amongst illogical reason ers.