at the occurrence of what is new, as to expect the recurrence of what
is old. In fact, an order of nature is at once necessary, and fatal, to
miracles. If there be no order of nature, miracles cannot be considered
supernatural occurrences, and have no evidential value; if there be an
order of nature, the evidence for its immutability must consequently
exceed the evidence for these isolated deviations from it. If we are
unable rationally to form expectations of the future from unvarying
experience in the past, it is still more irrational to call that
supernatural which is merely different from our past experience. Take,
for instance, the case of supposed exemption from the action of the law
of gravitation, which Archbishop Trench calls "a lost prerogative of our
race:"(1) we cannot rationally affirm that next week we may not be able
to walk on the sea, or ascend bodily into the air. To deny this because
we have not hitherto been able to do so is unreasonable; for, as Dr.
Mozley maintains, it is a mere irrational impulse which expects that
which has hitherto happened, when we have made such attempts, to happen
again next week. If we cannot rationally deny the possibility, however,
that we may be able at some future time to walk on the sea or ascend
into the air, the statement that these phenomena have already occurred
loses all its force, and such occurrences
{61}
cease to be in any way supernatural. If, on the other hand, it would
be irrational to affirm that we may next week become exempt from the
operation of the law of gravitation, it can only be so by the
admission that unvarying experience forbids the entertainment of such a
hypothesis, and in that case it equally forbids belief in the statement
that such acts ever actually took place. If we deny the future
possibility on any ground of reason, we admit that we have grounds
of reason for expecting the future to be like the past, and therefore
contradict Dr. Mozley's conclusion; and if we cannot deny it upon any
ground of reason, we extinguish the claim of such occurrences in the
past to any supernatural character. Any argument which could destroy
faith in the order of nature would be equally destructive to miracles.
If we have no right to believe in a rule, there can be no right to
speak of exceptions. The result in any case is this, that whether
the principle of the order of nature be established or refuted, the
supernatural pretensions of miracles are disallowed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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