Superstition and Force: Essays on the Wager of Law, the Wager of Battle, the Ordeal, TortureLea, Henry Charles
History
Superstition and Force: Essays on the Wager of Law, the Wager of Battle, the Ordeal, Torture
Lea, Henry Charles
Ordeal; Torture; Wager of battle; Wager of law
In thus abrogating the wager of battle, Philippe le Bel was in advance
of his age. Before three years were over he was forced to abandon
the position he had assumed; and though he gave as a reason for the
restoration of the duel that its absence had proved a fruitful source
of encouragement for crime and villany,[744] yet at the same time he
took care to place on record the assertion of his own conviction that
it was worthless as a means of seeking justice.[745] In thus legalizing
it by the Ordonnance of 1306, however, he by no means replaced it on
its former footing. It was restricted to criminal cases involving the
death penalty, excepting theft, and it was only permitted when the
crime was notorious, the guilt of the accused probable, and no other
evidence attainable.[746] The ceremonies prescribed, moreover, were
fearfully expensive, and put it out of the reach of all except the
wealthiest pleaders. As the ordonnance, which is very carefully drawn,
only refers to appeals made by the prosecutor, it may fairly be assumed
that the defendant could merely accept the challenge and had no right
to offer it.
Even with these limitations, Philippe was not disposed to sanction
the practice within the domains of the crown, for, the next year
(1307), we find him commanding the seneschal of Toulouse to allow
no duel to be adjudged in his court, but to send all cases in which
the combat might arise to the Parlement of Paris for decision.[747]
This was equivalent to a formal prohibition. During the whole of the
period under consideration, numerous causes came before the Parlement
concerning challenges to battle, on appeals from various jurisdictions
throughout the country, and it is interesting to observe how uniformly
some valid reason was found for its refusal. In the public register of
decisions, extending from 1254 to 1318, scarcely a single example of
its permission is to be found.[748] One doubtful instance which I have
observed is a curious case occurring in 1292, wherein a man accused
a woman of homicide in the court of the Chapter of Soissons, and the
royal officers interfered on the ground that the plaintiff was a
bastard. As by the local custom he thus was in some sort a serf of the
crown, they assumed that he could not risk his body without the express
permission of the king. The Chapter contended for the appellant’s
legitimacy, and the case became so much obscured by the loss of the
record of examination made, that the Parlement finally shuffled it out
of court without any definite decision.[749]
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