Superstition and Force: Essays on the Wager of Law, the Wager of Battle, the Ordeal, TortureLea, Henry Charles
History
Superstition and Force: Essays on the Wager of Law, the Wager of Battle, the Ordeal, Torture
Lea, Henry Charles
Ordeal; Torture; Wager of battle; Wager of law
In 1774, the subject incidentally attracted attention in a manner not
very creditable to the enlightenment of English legislation. When, to
punish the rebellious Bostonians for destroying the obnoxious tea,
a “Bill for the improved administration of justice in the province
of Massachusetts Bay” was passed, it originally contained a clause
depriving the New Englanders of the appeal of death, by which, it will
be remembered, a man acquitted of a charge of murder could be again
prosecuted by the next of kin, and the question could be determined
by the wager of battle. The denial of this ancestral right aroused
the indignation of the liberal party in the House of Commons, and
the point was warmly contested. The learned and eloquent Dunning,
afterwards Lord Ashburton, one of the leaders of opposition, defended
the ancient custom in the strongest terms. “I rise,” said he, “to
support that great pillar of the constitution, the appeal for murder;
I fear there is a wish to establish a precedent for taking it away
in England as well as in the colonies. It is called a remnant of
barbarism and gothicism. The whole of our constitution, for aught I
know, is gothic.... I wish, sir, that gentlemen would be a little more
cautious, and consider that the yoke we are framing for the despised
colonists may be tied round our own necks!” Even Burke was heard to
lift a warning voice against the proposed innovation, and the obnoxious
clause had to be struck out before the ministerial majority could pass
the bill.[813] Something was said about reforming the law throughout
the empire, but it was not done, and the beauty of the “great pillar of
the constitution,” the appeal of death, was shown when the nineteenth
century was disgraced by the resurrection of all the barbaric elements
of criminal jurisprudence. In 1818, the case of Ashford _vs._ Thornton
created much excitement. Ashford was the brother of a murdered girl,
whose death, under circumstances of peculiar atrocity, was charged
upon Thornton, with much appearance of probability. Acquitted on a
jury trial, Thornton was appealed by Ashford, when he pleaded “Not
guilty, and I am ready to defend the same by my body.” After elaborate
argument, Lord Ellenborough, with the unanimous assent of his brother
justices, sustained the appellee’s right to this as “the usual and
constitutional mode of trial,” expounding the law in almost the same
terms as those which we read in Bracton and Beaumanoir.[814] The
curious crowd was sorely disappointed when the appellant withdrew, and
the chief justice was relieved from the necessity of presiding over a
gladiatorial exhibition. A similar case occurred almost simultaneously
in Ireland, and the next year the Act 59 Geo. III. chap. 46, at length
put an end to this remnant of Teutonic barbarism.[815]
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Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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