The result of this system was that, in causes subject to such appeals, no witness could be forced to testify, by the French law of the thirteenth century, unless his principal entered into bonds to see him harmless in case of challenge, to provide a champion, and to make good all damages in case of defeat;[336] though it is difficult to understand how this could be satisfactorily arranged, since the penalties inflicted on a vanquished witness were severe, being, in civil causes, the loss of a hand and a fine at the pleasure of the suzerain, while in criminal actions “il perderoit le cors avecques.”[337] The only limit to this abuse was that witnesses were not liable to challenge in cases concerning matters of less value than five sous and one denier.[338] * * * * * If the position of a witness was thus rendered unenviable, that of the judge was little better. As though the duel had not received sufficient extension by the facilities for its employment just described, another mode of appealing to the sword in all cases was invented by which it became competent for the defeated party in any suit to challenge the court itself, and thus obtain a forcible reversal of judgment. It must be borne in mind that this was not quite as absurd a practice as it may seem to us in modern times, for under the feudal system the dispensing of justice was one of the most highly prized attributes of sovereignty; and, except in England, where the royal judges were frequently ecclesiastics, the seignorial courts were presided over by warriors. In Germany, indeed, where the magistrates of the lower tribunals were elective, they were required to be active and vigorous of body.[339] Towards the end of the twelfth century in England we find Glanville acknowledging his uncertainty as to whether or not the court could depute the settlement of such an appeal to a champion, and also as to what, in case of defeat, was the legal position of the court thus convicted of injustice.[340] These doubts would seem to indicate that the custom was still of recent introduction in England, and not as yet practised to an extent sufficient to afford a settled basis of precedents for its details. Elsewhere, however, it was firmly established. In 1195, the customs of St. Quentin allow to the disappointed pleader unlimited recourse against his judge.[341] Towards the latter half of the thirteenth century, we find in the _Conseil_ of Pierre de Fontaines the custom in its fullest vigor and just on the eve of its decline. No restriction appears to be imposed as to the cases in which appeal by battle was permitted, except that it was not allowed to override the customary law.[342] The suitor selected any one of three judges agreeing in the verdict; he could appeal at any stage of the proceedings when a point was decided against him; if unsuccessful, he was only liable in a pecuniary penalty to the judges for the wrong done them, and the judge, if vanquished, was