Superstition and Force: Essays on the Wager of Law, the Wager of Battle, the Ordeal, TortureLea, Henry Charles
History
Superstition and Force: Essays on the Wager of Law, the Wager of Battle, the Ordeal, Torture
Lea, Henry Charles
Ordeal; Torture; Wager of battle; Wager of law
In Germany, as a general rule, either party had a right to demand
the judicial combat,[398] subject, however, in practice, to several
important limitations. Thus, difference of rank between the parties
afforded the superior a right to decline a challenge, as we shall see
more fully hereafter.[399] Relationship between the contestants was
also an impediment, of which either might avail himself,[400] and
even the fact that the defendant was not a native of the territory
in which the action was brought gave him the privilege of refusing
the appeal.[401] Still, we find the principle laid down even in the
fourteenth century that cases of homicide could not be determined in
any other manner.[402] There were circumstances, indeed, in which the
complainant, if he could bring the evidence of seven witnesses in his
favor, could decline the duel; but if he choose to prove the charge
by the combat, no examination or testimony was admitted. In the same
way, if a man was slain while committing theft or robbery, and was
prosecuted for the crime, the accuser was not bound to offer the duel
if he could produce the evidence of seven witnesses; but if a relative
of the dead man offered to vindicate him by combat, this annulled
all the evidence, and conviction could not be had without the battle
ordeal.[403] A curious provision in the Saxon burgher law allowed a
man who had been assaulted to challenge to the duel as many men as he
had wounds—but the wounds were required to be of a certain degree of
severity—_wunden kampffbaren_.[404] So the contemporary law of Suabia
provides that in accusations of personal violence, the duel was not to
be allowed, unless the injury inflicted on the complainant had been
sufficiently serious to cause permanent maiming,[405] thus showing how
thoroughly different in spirit was the judicial combat from the modern
code of honor which has been affiliated upon it. Yet a general rule is
found expressed to the effect that it was necessary only in cases where
no other evidence was obtainable, when the result could be safely left
to the judgment of Omniscience.[406]
In the Latin kingdoms of the East, and among the Armenians, who,
curiously enough, adopted the customs of their fellow Christians from
the West, it would seem that in both the noble and the roturier courts,
in civil as well as in criminal cases, the plaintiff or prosecutor
was not obliged personally to fight, but that if one of his witnesses
offered battle, the defendant or accused was not permitted to decline
the challenge under pain of losing his suit or being condemned. On the
other hand, unless the complainant or accuser had a witness who was
willing to offer battle, the oath of denial of the other party was
sufficient, and in criminal cases the accuser was subjected to the
_talio_.[407]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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