James, Psychology, 1:226—“It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not _thought_, or _this thought_, or _that thought_, but _my thought_, every thought being owned. The universal conscious fact is not ‘feelings and thoughts exist,’ but ‘I think,’ and ‘I feel.’ ” Professor James is compelled to say this, even though he begins his Psychology without insisting upon the existence of a soul. Hamilton’s Reid, 443—“Shall I think that thought can stand by itself? or that ideas can feel pleasure or pain?” R. T. Smith, Man’s Knowledge, 44—“We say ‘my notions and my passions,’ and when we use these phrases we imply that our central self is felt to be something different from the notions or passions which belong to it or characterize it for a time.” Lichtenberg: “We should say, ‘It thinks;’ just as we say, ‘It lightens,’ or ‘It rains.’ In saying ‘Cogito,’ the philosopher goes too far if he translates it, ‘I think.’ ” Are the faculties, then, an army without a general, or an engine without a driver? In that case we should not _have_ sensations,—we should only _be_ sensations. Professor C. A. Strong: “I have knowledge of _other minds_. This non-empirical knowledge—transcendent knowledge of things-in-themselves, derived neither from experience nor reasoning, and assuming that like consequents (intelligent movements) must have like antecedents (thoughts and feelings), and also assuming instinctively that something exists outside of my own mind—this refutes the post-Kantian phenomenalism. _Perception_ and _memory_ also involve transcendence. In both I transcend the bounds of experience, as truly as in my knowledge of other minds. In memory I recognize a _past_, as distinguished from the present. In perception I cognize a possibility of _other_ experiences like the present, and this alone gives the sense of permanence and reality. Perception and memory refute phenomenalism. Things-in-themselves must be assumed in order to fill the gaps between individual minds, and to give coherence and intelligibility to the universe, and so to avoid pluralism. If matter can influence and even extinguish our minds, it must have some force of its own, some existence in itself. If consciousness is an evolutionary product, it must have arisen from simpler mental facts. But these simpler mental facts are only another name for things-in-themselves. A deep prerational instinct compels us to recognize them, for they cannot be logically demonstrated. We must assume them in order to give continuity and intelligibility to our conceptions of the universe.” See, on Bain’s Cerebral Psychology, Martineau’s Essays, 1:265. On the physiological method of mental philosophy, see Talbot, in Bap. Quar., 1871:1; Bowen, in Princeton Rev., March, 1878:423-450; Murray, Psychology, 279-287.