Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of InfantryBalck, W. (William)
History
Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Balck, W. (William)
Military art and science; Tactics
“Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately
a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by
Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center
group) on Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, is characteristic of the
Russian ideas. On the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on
the Turkish works without fire preparation; the firing lines halted
400 to 600 m. from the Turkish position and commenced firing. They
succumbed because it never occurred to the leaders to reinforce
them and attempt to gain a superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s
attack there was no sign of actual fire preparation, but, as soon
as the line halted, strong reinforcements were pushed in to carry
it forward. The attack, made on a front of about 800 m., suffered
heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations were in
complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the decimated first line
(8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies carried it forward
some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies in one body,
which carried the line forward to within approximately 100 to 150 m.
of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself into the fight
and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his badly cut up
troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one worthy
of imitation.
The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive in
this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated,
which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at
long ranges. The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within
decisive range of the position of their opponents.
The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an
excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the
long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m.
(Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at
Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even
through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be
compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during
their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders
at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile
position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under
fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143]
[143] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, IV, p. 141.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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