At =Weiszenburg (Vth Army Corps)= 1 officer for every 14 men; „ =Wörth (Vth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ; „ =Wörth (XIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ; „ =Vionville (IIIrd Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 21 „ ; „ =Vionville (Xth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 24 „ ; „ =Gravelotte (Guard Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 22.5 „ ; „ =Gravelotte (XIIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ; „ =Colenso= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ; „ =Magersfontain= 1 „ „ „ 11.8 „ ; Colonel HESSERT[183] writes the following in regard to the losses among the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight of the 16 field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with the regiments and battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost all of these officers were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company commanders--almost all of them dismounted--and 43 of the 151 company officers were placed out of action. This would be a loss of 50% in field officers, 42% in adjutants, 37% in company commanders, and 29% in company officers.” [183] _Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre M/74 und M/66_, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115. On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its officers and 44% of its men--19 officers and 431 men, in about three-quarters of an hour. On Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, the _Ugla_ Regiment lost 20 of its officers, _i.e._, 40%; the _Jaroslaw_ Regiment, 25 officers, _i.e._, 64%; the total loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%, that of the last named to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the _Vladimir_ Regiment, 14 were placed out of action. After the assault on the =Tuminling Pass= on Oct. 12th, 1905, the East Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing line, and after the battle of =Sandepu= only 5. These examples are not isolated ones. After the battle on the =Yalu=, the 11th Rifle Regiment had present for duty only one field officer, and the 12th only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the _Yoshihoka_ Regiment (3rd Japanese Division) had present for duty only 3 lieutenants; one battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one company by a private. 14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE. The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.