Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of InfantryBalck, W. (William)
History
Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Balck, W. (William)
Military art and science; Tactics
While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general
manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ radically as to
details. “If all the advocates of a normal attack had to describe
it in words, there would be about as many suggestions as there are
advocates. Which of the many normal attack schemes is the most
suitable for average troops? A conference called for the purpose of
investigating this point would probably have the strange result that
each representative would concede that what the others desire is
practicable but need not be done.”[209] Anyone who thinks himself
capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that
all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations
entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been
foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many
details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which
cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises
in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future.
Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they
have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their
regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to
strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on
tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help
yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of
doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity,
because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own
initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same
proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded
universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of
our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future
war may correct their provisions.[210]
[209] General BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _I, Betrachtungen_, etc.
p. 42
_British Drill Regulations_: “Although a normal attack is
apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations,
the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to
lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal
attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make
themselves felt through losses and failures.”
[210] Major VON HÜLSEN, _Schema oder Selbständigkeit?_, (Berlin,
1906).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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