The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. V. LETTOW-VORBECK, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations. Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing, the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections). The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in close country, if, as recommended by the author,[216] the battalions in route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However, even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable targets to hostile machine guns and artillery. [216] See _Taktik_, III, p. 307. The British were surprised in close order formations at =Magersfontain= and =Colenso=. In subsequent engagements, in order to avoid this, their infantry, when still a great distance away from the enemy, took up an attack formation which permitted only movements directly to the front (at =Poplar Grove,= for example, this was done when 10 km. from the enemy). An advance in such a formation was possible only because the plains of South Africa presented no obstacles, and because the British had only to hold the enemy who stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade formed its four battalions into an open double column with a front of 2000 and a depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions being 300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so that its eight companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace intervals between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 paces. The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used in other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared. [Illustration: =The Formation of a Brigade of Four Battalions of the 6th Infantry Division= during the advance on =Poplar Grove= on March 7th, 1900. Front about 800 m., depth, 1800-2000 m.]