On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th Infantry Regiments on the =Omar Bey Tabia= had been repulsed, the 64th and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the 31st Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned force was not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army Corps) were placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In spite of the heavy losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure of the first attack had demonstrated that such a small force was insufficient for taking the Turkish work, only two regiments were again sent forward to the attack (in other words, 6 battalions instead of 18). When this assault had also been repulsed, and one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown in, 6 battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only when the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions lost 115 officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in reserve would have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous employment of adequate forces would have assured the success of the Russian infantry.[231] [231] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 211. The same thing occurred at =Gorni-Dubniac=. As the Russians, who advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak garrison of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the isolated attacking groups which followed each other. The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient fire power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the battles in the =Russo-Japanese war=. On the left flank, at =Wafangu= (15th June, 1904), the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced with one battalion of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 3rd in the first line, with four battalions in the second line, and with three battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. A full development of the fire power of the division did not take place at all.[232] The 2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers and 1464 men. The 1¹⁄₂ batteries attached to the division were shot to pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese. [232] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-Japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 56.