These figures can only serve as a very general guide, of course, and should be considered minima. The number of troops required for attack or defense must be determined separately for each individual case. At =Lovtcha=, 25 battalions, 92 guns, and 15 sotnias were not considered too large a force for attacking 8000 Turks with only 6 guns. At =Gorni Dubniac=, 3 infantry divisions of the Guard, with 90 guns, attacked 6 weak Turkish battalions having only 4 guns. After the first two unsuccessful assaults on =Plevna=, the Russians overestimated the strength of the enemy. Osman Pasha’s force was estimated at 80,000 men, and, consequently, during the September assaults, 90,000 men and 400 guns were deemed necessary to attack barely 40,000 Turks and 60 guns. From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that the =maximum frontage= is justifiable, when a force whose flanks are secure, occupies a position prepared for defense, or acts as a reserve and is to bring about a decision which has been prepared by other troops. On the other hand, the =maximum distribution in depth= is necessary for a force acting alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between these two extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of an attacking force. The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 373) accordingly fix the frontage of a company in attack at 150 m. and that of a brigade of six battalions at 1500 m. It is impossible to give a definite ratio of effective strength to combat frontage. Thus, while in attack a company puts into the line about 1.3 rifles per meter of its front, the brigade employs 4 rifles per meter, and the larger units a proportionally greater number. The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units composing it.