===================+=======+=======+======+==========+========== | | | |Per 10,000| | Jap. | Russ. |Front-|men.[244] | Per m. | | | age. |Jap.|Russ.|Jap.|Russ. -------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+----- | | | km. | m. | men. Liao Yang (West and| | | | | | | South front) |106,700|150,000| 26 |2600| 1750|3.9 | 5.9 | | | | | | | Shaho |148,000|257,000| 48 |3330| 1980|3. | 5. | | | | | | | Mukden (exclusive | | | | | | | of Yalu Army) |247,000|336,000| 96 |3960| 2970|2.6 | 3.4 -------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+----- [244] According to data given by Lieut. Col. Yoda in the _Journal of the Officers’ Association_, Tokio. The realization that troops in fortified positions only require small reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused frontages to be increased and depth of combat formations to be decreased. Gaps in the attacking line, provided they were kept under observation, proved by no means a disadvantage.[245] [245] At Mukden, on March 3rd, 1905, there was a gap of 7 km. between the Japanese IVth and Ist Armies, which was covered by only one infantry regiment of Reservists, two dismounted cavalry regiments, and one battalion of artillery. However, the Russians were fighting on the passive defensive in this case. The insignificant danger to be apprehended from such gaps is especially emphasised by the French regulations. During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese lacked the necessary reinforcements. ~INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE FORMATIONS.~[246] [246] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteristische Reflexionen_.