Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past =Vionville= on =Flavigny= and the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire directed upon these companies caused them to deviate to right and left, to leave their battalions, and to lose the march direction designated by the regimental commander.[271] One company of the IInd Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, which formed the center (march direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated in the assault made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the other companies moved to the left against Vionville and were joined by a company of the IIIrd Battalion.--“A peculiar feature of this fight was the fire directed from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced against the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies of the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the 35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry) were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move in a totally different direction than was originally intended. The direction was maintained to a certain extent only by two companies (the 3rd and 11th of the 20th Infantry).”[272] [271] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 560. [272] V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p. 106. With a sketch (A) showing lines of advance of the companies. While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not underestimate the difficulties of an advance over open ground, they require that the march direction be maintained and that cover be utilized only within the assigned “combat section”; they leave it to subordinate commanders to choose suitable expedients for crossing such unfavorable ground. “Within the limits of the section assigned to an organization for an attack, the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an approach under cover is practicable. _If suitable terrain is lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over the open plain._” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). For purposes of instruction, it is entirely correct to require “that even on terrain devoid of cover, well-trained infantry should not open fire until the medium ranges are reached.” (Par. 326 German I. D. R.). The necessity, when under hostile fire, of adapting movements to the accidents of the ground, should not impair the energy of the advance and cause portions of the attacking force to lag behind, thereby disintegrating it. On the other hand, we should not be afraid to leave gaps in our attacking line, as the enemy would, in any case, not be able to use them for his own advance.