the cleared kaoliang field. In the open, the skirmishers were unable to advance a single step; every attempt, on their part, to rise, was prevented. Whether it would have been possible to advance by crawling, while keeping up a constant fire, can, of course, not be determined now. [296] _Russian Invalid_, October 1904. At nightfall the Japanese again advanced in the kaoliang field and annoyed the machine gun company throughout the night with rifle fire. At daybreak they were again driven back by a continued fire from the machine guns. The Japanese skirmishers remained in readiness, however, in the kaoliang field, and fired on any target that offered. When their fire became more and more galling, the machine gun commander decided to send forward a non-commissioned officer and 15 men (Reservists and horse holders, armed with rifle and bayonet) to drive them out. The undertaking was successful. It was found that this continuous annoying fire had been kept up by only 1 officer and 24 men. At 3 P. M., several Japanese assembled at the railway bridge; a signal detachment also appeared. The fire at will of the infantry, directed on this body of men, had no effect whatever; but after two machine guns, one using an elevation of 1025, the other one of 1075 m., had fired on that point for a short time, the Japanese disappeared. At 5 P. M., the machine guns succeeded in repulsing an enveloping movement made against their right flank. This movement was betrayed only by the motion of the kaoliang stalks. Toward 7 P. M., the Japanese directed artillery fire upon the machine guns, which suffered considerable losses, although the personnel was protected by an earth parapet and had ceased to work the guns. This fire did not cease until nightfall, and, at 9 P. M., the position was evacuated by order. An attack made by the Japanese during the night found the machine guns gone. During the two days of the fight the company had lost 30% of its personnel, and had fired 26,000 rounds of ammunition, or only about 3200 rounds per gun during two days. The superiority of the fire of these machine guns over that of the Japanese skirmish line can perhaps only be explained by the small numbers of the latter. In the defensive position on the =Shaho= and at =Mukden=, machine guns were employed in favorable positions, behind sandbag parapets and under splinter proof roofs. According to Lieutenant-Colonel ANISINOW, good results were obtained against skirmishers up to 1050 m., against closed bodies of infantry and against troops of cavalry (_Eskadrons_) up to 1400 m.; against batteries of artillery, halted in the open, staffs, and columns, the fire was sufficiently effective up to 1960 m. 8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUN BATTERIES.