The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge, on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would look differently upon the possibility of making a mounted charge during a battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on the Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand of infantry that it close with the enemy after it has suffered tremendous losses, why should we not demand the same of cavalry whose mobility is disproportionately greater.” (_Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June 15th, 1882_). The less the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the greater the certainty of such success. The troops should be accustomed in time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian army is, at any rate, worthy of consideration.[303] He proposed that cavalry ride at full speed through infantry lines deployed with three paces between files. Some infantrymen are, indeed, bound to be injured in such charges, but the wounds produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry accustomed to such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in action as when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on the battlefield. [303] _Vorbereitung der Truppen für den Kampf_, I, p. 55.