As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon the steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would seem to be advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry gets within short range.[309] General Dragomirov says in his forcible manner, “It is not the bullet which has been fired, but the bullet which is still in the rifle-barrel, and reserved for short range, that harms charging cavalry.” If infantry in line was able to repulse a cavalry charge in the past at 40 paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first volley,[310] the chances of doing this with modern rifles would be still greater, if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were absolutely certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.[311] If infantry does not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have to reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be able to carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes of instruction in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If an infantry unit is trained in time of peace always to open fire at the medium ranges on charging cavalry, the unexpected appearance of hostile cavalry at short ranges in actual war, is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks of such a unit, than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its fire until the cavalry has come within short range. [309] “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted charges is for all commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and coolly to size up the situation, and to act with determination. All precipitation or haste would be disastrous, for it would communicate itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired too late upon cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister V. WÄLDSTATTEN. [310] At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at 140 and 80 paces, and repulsed the charge. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 46_, p. 186. In the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the 87th Infantry repulsed a charge at 60 paces. _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1217. [311] The _France Militaire_ contains the following statement in regard to the effect produced on horses by bullets from the French Lebel rifle in the engagements near Casablanca in 1907: “Many officers serving in the field observed that the small caliber bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or when a vital organ had been hit. _At Casablanca, horses that had been hit by several bullets continued to gallop for a long while._ This is a remarkable phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as out of action every horse that has been hit by a projectile. This is entirely incorrect. _Many wounded horses carry their riders into the melée and do not die until the day after the fight._ This was observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side.