reasons: first, in order that a favorable target whose re-appearance the hostile batteries could await with loaded guns, may not be presented to the enemy at one point for a prolonged period; second, in order that movements by the flank on the part of the infantry may be obviated. The column of squads would be a suitable formation in which two battalions of infantry could simultaneously pass through the line of guns approximately within the space occupied by one battery. These battalions should then at once deploy, executing front into line toward their respective outer flanks. The guns can resume firing only when their infantry has reached a point 3-400 m. in front of them. The artillery will be able to resume its fire earlier when it is posted in rear of a crest, and for this reason such points should be selected for the passage of infantry. 2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.[315] [315] A lecture delivered by Major C. E. D. BUDWORTH, R.A., at the Royal Artillery Institution, on December 3, 1908, entitled, _Infantry Formations in the Attack: from an Artilleryman’s Point of View_, contains some interesting information. The lecture mentioned appeared in _The Journal of the Royal Artillery_ for February, 1909. _Translator_. In almost every attack, infantry will be obliged to advance for considerable distances under artillery fire without being able to take advantage of cover. It should guard against being surprised by artillery fire while in an unsuitable formation. In the first place, everything that facilitates the enemy’s adjustment and observation of fire should be avoided. (See p. 119 supra). To this end, infantry should not remain unnecessarily long near objects that are clearly visible at a great distance. If it is noticed that the enemy is beginning to adjust his fire on some prominent feature of the terrain, that point should be passed as quickly as possible; the same is true of a plain in the enemy’s zone of fire. Narrow columns, separated by intervals of 50 m., their heads not on the same line, are advantageous. This formation prevents shrapnel from simultaneously striking two columns, and makes it difficult for the enemy to judge the relative position of the smoke from the burst of his shrapnel with respect to the target. This increases the difficulties of the enemy’s observation of fire, as it is not easy for him to determine whether his shots go over or fall short. A shallow echelon formation (about 50 m. deep, as used in Russia, for example) is valueless for reducing losses, owing to the depth of the beaten zone of modern projectiles. The narrowest possible front should be presented to the enemy when within his zone of fire.