Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of InfantryBalck, W. (William)
History
Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Balck, W. (William)
Military art and science; Tactics
The disaster which overtook Trautmann’s Battery at St. Hubert, during
the battle of Gravelotte, demonstrates how difficult it is to unlimber
on open ground when under effective infantry and artillery fire; but,
if five limbers with their teams had not stampeded, perhaps it might
have been possible after a while, for the battery to reopen fire.
Hasse’s Battery, also at St. Hubert, was rendered incapable of moving
in a short time, but, in spite of the greatest difficulties, managed to
continue its fire for about two hours, though with only a part of the
guns. Gnügge’s Battery managed to unlimber under cover of a garden wall
at St. Hubert and to maintain itself there under enfilading infantry
fire till the end of the battle. Trautmann’s Battery lost 17 men and 37
horses; Hasse’s Battery, 38 men and 77 horses; and Gnügge’s Battery, 15
men and 40 horses.[323]
[323] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, III, p. 227.
Unlimbering under uninterrupted hostile fire at short range will always
produce conditions similar to those in Trautmann’s Battery, and in
the two British batteries of Colonel Long at Colenso.[324] These two
batteries did not cease firing because they had suffered too heavily,
but only because they had expended all their limber ammunition and the
caissons were unable to come up. It was impossible for these batteries
to limber up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to
destroy a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great
quantities of ammunition were expended.
[324] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 43.
At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division
suffered heavy losses. “Although the first caisson sections were up and
the men with them were detailed to assist in working the guns, the gun
squads in both batteries had dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P.
M., _i.e._, within half an hour.” Immediately after the French attack
had been repulsed, one of these batteries was able to accompany the
advancing infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light Battery)
could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had lost 29 men and
34 horses.[325] This example proves again that when artillery has once
managed to go into position and to open fire, it cannot be annihilated
by infantry alone, and therefore need not fear to take up a more than
temporary position in the first line.
[325] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, 8, pp. 44 and 210.
HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 40.
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