Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of InfantryBalck, W. (William)
History
Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Balck, W. (William)
Military art and science; Tactics
2. The engagement of the 2nd Bavarian Division at =La Thibaudine=
(=Beaumont=). The French concentration for action had progressed
farther than that of the Bavarians. The reconnaissance by the cavalry
was insufficient.[343]
[343] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 90.
3. The fight of Mondel’s Brigade at =Trautenau=.[344] Likewise the
fight of the Vth Army Corps at =Nachod= on June 27th, 1866.
[344] _Taktik_, V, p. 206. STROBL, _Trautenau_, p. 8, et seq.
KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, p. 16.
X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE.
1. LESSONS OF WAR.
During the =Boer War= (1899-1902), the British infantry always
attacked positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated
fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British,
their failures in the early engagements of the war may generally be
traced to the following causes:--
1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be
surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of
the Guards at =Modder River=). In many instances, the British forces
were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s
Brigade at =Colenso=).
2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted
against each other. (=Modder River=, =Magersfontain=, =Colenso=).
3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire
surprises carried out by small detachments.
4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.
5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions).
The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted
action was a rare exception.
6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of
an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.
7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At
=Magersfontain= only 8¹⁄₂ battalions out of 13, and at =Colenso=
only 6 battalions out of 16¹⁄₂, had been seriously engaged. When
=Spionskop= was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged.
The attacks were begun, but not pushed home.
The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account