[83] For historical reference as to the importance of the brigade in action, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_ (August and September numbers 1877) entitled: _Die Infanterie Brigade in ihrer Entwickelung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In regard to the employment of regiments in line or in echelon, see Memoir by General von Moltke on the tactical lessons gained in the campaign of 1866. MOLTKE, _Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq. [84] The fight of François’ Brigade at Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._ I, p. 310, et seq. The formation, side by side, of the six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps in the attack on the hill at Forbach (Spicheren) would have been inappropriate and would have disrupted all organizations. The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the decisive moment, although the state of the fight may, at the outset, invite a more rapid extension of front. 9. EXTENDED ORDER. Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of skirmishers needed (_i.e._, the denser the firing line).[85] If the enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (_i.e._, a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion. [85] The Boers with their superior weapons and better marksmanship, and further because they never cared to become involved in a fight at close quarters, found thin firing lines sufficient.