While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very soon cease of their own accord. The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive role here. The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with the smallest fraction led by an officer, _i.e._, with a platoon. The following appropriate statement appears in _Taktische Rückblicke auf 1866_: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have someone assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which he finds himself, is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed upon his officers. If the officer’s quiet glance reminds him that here, as in peace time, the first duty is obedience, and if he sees the officer subsequently advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will, as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. It is this faithful attachment to the person of his officer, rather than ambition and patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. Those who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This would indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice, if its soldiers would do nothing in action but their simple duty voluntarily.”