Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of InfantryBalck, W. (William)
History
Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Balck, W. (William)
Military art and science; Tactics
The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of
targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small
size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can
be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of
sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to
be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force,
need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following
the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The
drawbacks of the _petits paquets_ would appear only if every company
were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action.
11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER.
In =close order= the men are placed so close together that they can be
led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The
position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of
him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid
of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry
fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the
enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile
fire compels the most extended deployment.[102]
[102] Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ
close order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken
enemy, although this was still prescribed by the regulations.
Whenever this was attempted tremendous losses resulted. In the battle
of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment,
formed into a half-battalion, and following the other companies of
the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, suffered
in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of
about 400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression
produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and
deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion
had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by
the three officers still remaining.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr.
35_, p. 23.
In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not
at all exceptional.
On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry,
advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in
half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12
officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and
wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery
and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments
of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. _Gen. St. W._, II,
p. 724. _Der 18. August_, p. 152.
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