Talleyrand was already in diplomatic correspondence with Russia, Prussia and Austria, about the “perfidy” of England in refusing to carry out the chief enactment of the Treaty of Amiens—the evacuation of Malta. The impressionable young Tsar was touched, and complained of the obscurity of England’s aims. Napoleon at once proposed that he should mediate between the belligerents, and for some months he was understood to be prepared to negotiate in this sense. As a fact he was deeply engrossed in humanitarian reform in his own country, and he had a growing suspicion of Napoleon’s aims. After prolonged communications he succeeded in drawing Prussia into a defensive alliance (May 24th, 1805) against France. This was a serious diplomatic defeat for Talleyrand, who had at the same time been endeavouring to secure the Prussian alliance. He had, in fact, concentrated his efforts to obtain at least a benevolent neutrality from Berlin. “Do not be afraid of that mountain of snow, Russia,” he wrote. Napoleon distributed honours at the Prussian Court, and made generous offers of terms, but the deeply perplexed and anxious successor of Frederic the Great ended his long vacillation by concluding a treaty with his friend, the Tsar. It would be useless here to describe in any detail the diplomatic work of the next two years (from the declaration of war by England to the opening of the campaign in 1805). Talleyrand’s task was to meet and defeat the effort of Pitt to raise up a fresh coalition against Napoleon. He made a loyal and brilliant effort to do so, but entirely failed. Napoleon’s encroachments were too obvious, his power in Europe too menacing, his concessions in diplomacy too tardy and niggardly to enable him to resist the power of English gold and the zeal of the alienated Tsar. His only successes were of an inglorious character. He forced helpless Spain to acquiesce in the sale of Louisiana to the United States for eighty millions, and to send seventy-two millions a year to the French treasury. Napoleon assisted his diplomacy in this case with two arguments: the formation of a huge military camp near the Spanish frontier, and a threat to draw the attention of Europe to the delicate relations of the Spanish Queen and leading minister.