The last point was to obtain suitable instructions from the King, or, rather, give sober instructions to Louis XVIII. He therefore drew up a long memorandum and programme, and got it signed by the King without difficulty. The French representatives at the Congress were to see that things were done in order and on principle. The Congress would have to settle what States should be represented in it, what its objects were, and how they were to be attained. In this regard the Treaty of May 30th must be followed, which promises a _general_ Congress. The idea of a “Power” must be taken in a wide sense, and all the States, large or small, that took part in the war must be admitted. The small German States should be formed into a confederation, and the Congress cannot accomplish this without their assistance. In the distribution of territory it must be remembered that modern Europe does not recognize that sovereignty may be obtained by mere conquest, and without the abdication of the conquered sovereign. “Sovereignty is, in the general society of Europe, what private ownership is in a particular civil society.” On this principle Saxony and the other German States must be dealt with. The Congress has to dispose of the territory renounced by France, and the principles of public right must guide the distribution. Balance of power does not mean equality of force. Small States must be preserved, and, _à fortiori_, Saxony, whose king has been a father to his people, a beneficent ruler. France must protect the little States against the larger; must see that Prussia does not get Mayence or any territory left of the Moselle, and so on. Poland is to be reconstructed, on condition that its restoration is entire and complete. England being equally conservative with France as to the state of Europe must be cultivated as an ally. In the end the memorandum lays down four chief points on which the representatives of France must insist, whatever concession they make apart from them. These are: 1. That Austria shall not obtain the States of the King of Sardinia for one of its princes; 2. That Naples shall be restored to Ferdinand IV.; 3. That the _whole_ of Poland shall not pass under the sovereignty of Russia; 4. That Prussia shall not get Saxony—“at least, not the whole of it”—nor Mayence. Had these four points been submitted to any other ambassador at the Congress beforehand he would have smiled. We have now to see how Talleyrand secured every one of them in the face of tremendous opposition.[54] CHAPTER XV A DIPLOMATIC ROMANCE