and their will to conquer. They knew now that they were Jerry’s master. There was an accumulation of old scores to wipe off, and though the beaten individual Boche would generally be treated with contemptuous good-humour, there remained the deep loathing of all the vile deeds by which the title of “Hun” had been earned. Exhaustion and physical distress were therefore thrust aside by the call for action. [Sidenote: _Miraumont, August 22-24_] At 2.30 a.m. on August 23 two companies of the 8th L.F. on the left and two of the 10th Manchesters on the right attacked the Dovecot. The enemy fought hard to retain his hold of this position, but the Salford and Oldham men fought still harder, and the Dovecot was finally won. Casualties were heavy on both sides. A number of prisoners were taken, and also a complete Field Dressing Station. The New Zealanders on the left advanced their right to conform; and their attack being successful they passed beyond the line of the 125th Brigade, which then swung forward its left flank until touch was restored and sent patrols down into the Miraumont Valley. During the night the 125th Brigade was relieved by the 126th (D Company, M.G. Battalion attached), which also took over 500 yards of front from the New Zealand Division, who were thus squeezed out by the 126th Brigade on their right and the 5th Division on the left. To exploit victories the following method was adopted— (_a_) Strong patrols, usually one platoon, would make good the ground by bounds. These patrols to be adequately supported. (_b_) When patrols were definitely held up, and the enemy located, the artillery would bombard points of resistance, and patrols would advance under a creeping barrage. (_c_) If the patrols were again held up, a set-piece attack would be organized. In making these attacks the enemy’s position would be turned from one or both flanks. Machine-gun sections were to be pushed up behind patrols close enough to give effective support by direct fire. At least one section R.E. to be with the advance-guard, and also parties of Tunnelling Companies, R.E., to locate and destroy road-mines and “booby-traps.” The Pioneer Battalion would be available under the Divisional Commander’s hand. The Commander of a higher formation must explain attack orders, personally or through a Staff Officer, verbally to the Commander of a lower formation, and wherever possible the objectives must be pointed out _on the ground_ to the subordinate commanders who had to carry out the operation. Briefly, the policy was to command the battle from horseback and not by telephone from a dug-out.