The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by CiceroCicero, Marcus Tullius
Philosophy
The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Happiness -- Early works to 1800
XIV. Your school, then, is now the only one remaining to be combated; for
the contest with the Academicians is an uncertain one, for they affirm
nothing, and, as if they despaired of arriving at any certain knowledge,
wish to follow whatever is probable. But we have more trouble with
Epicurus, because he combines two kinds of pleasure, and because he and
his friends, and many others since, have been advocates of that opinion;
and somehow or other, the people, who, though they have the least
authority, have nevertheless the greatest power, are on his side; and,
unless we refute them, all virtue, and all reputation, and all true glory,
must be abandoned. And so, having put aside the opinions of all the rest,
there remains a contest, not between Torquatus and me, but between virtue
and pleasure; and this contest Chrysippus, a man of great acuteness and
great industry, is far from despising; and he thinks that the whole
question as to the chief good is at stake in this controversy: but I
think, if I show the reality of what is honourable, and that it is a thing
to be sought for by reason of its own intrinsic excellence, and for its
own sake, that all your arguments are at once overthrown; therefore, when
I have once established what its character is, speaking briefly, as the
time requires, I shall approach all your arguments, O Torquatus, unless my
memory fails me.
We understand, then, that to be honourable which is such that, leaving all
advantage out of the question, it can be deservedly praised by itself,
without thinking of any reward or profit derived from it. And what its
character is may be understood, not so much by the definition which I have
employed, (although that may help in some degree,) as by the common
sentiments of all men, and by the zeal and conduct of every virtuous man;
for such do many things for this sole reason, because they are becoming,
because they are right, because they are honourable, even though they do
not perceive any advantage likely to result from them: for men differ from
beasts in many other things indeed, but especially in this one particular,
that they have reason and intellect given to them by nature, and a mind,
active, vigorous, revolving many things at the same time with the greatest
rapidity, and, if I may so say, sagacious to perceive the causes of
things, and their consequences and connexions, and to use metaphors, and
to combine things which are unconnected, and to connect the future with
the present, and to embrace in its view the whole course of a consistent
life. The same reason has also made man desirous of the society of men,
and inclined to agree with them by nature, and conversation, and custom;
so that, setting out with affection for his friends and relations, he
proceeds further, and unites himself in a society, first of all of his
fellow-countrymen, and subsequently of all mortals; and as Plato wrote to
Archytas, recollects that he has been born, not for himself alone, but for
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account