The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by CiceroCicero, Marcus Tullius
Philosophy
The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Happiness -- Early works to 1800
But it is worth while to consider on what arguments acute men rely for
proving this point. Those arts, say they, of which the perfection can be
increased, show that the completeness of their contraries can likewise be
increased. But no addition can be made to the perfection of virtue.
Therefore, also, vices will not be susceptible of any increase, for they
are the contraries of virtues. Shall we say, then, that things which are
doubtful are made plain by things which are evident, or that things which
are evident are obscured by things that are doubtful? But this is evident,
that different vices are greater in different people. This is doubtful,
whether any addition can be made to that which you call the chief good.
But you, while what you ought to do is to try and illustrate what is
doubtful by what is evident, endeavour to get rid of what is evident by
what is doubtful. And, therefore, you will find yourself hampered by the
same reasoning which I used just now. For if it follows that some vices
are not greater than others, because no addition can be made to that chief
good which you describe, since it is quite evident that the vices of all
men are not equal, you must change your definition of the chief good. For
we must inevitably maintain this rule, that when a consequence is false,
the premises from which the consequence proceeds cannot be true.
XXV. What, then, is the cause of these difficulties? A vain-glorious
parade in defining the chief good. For when it is positively asserted that
what is honourable is the sole good, all care for one’s health, all
attention to one’s estate, all regard for the government of the republic,
all regularity in transacting business, all the duties of life, in short,
are put an end to. Even that very honourableness, in which alone you
assert that everything is comprised, must be abandoned. All which
arguments are carefully urged against Ariston by Chrysippus. And from that
embarrassment it is that all those fallaciously speaking wiles, as Attius
calls them, have arisen. For because wisdom had no ground on which to rest
her foot, when all the duties were taken away, (and duties were taken away
when all power of selection and discrimination was denied; for what
choice, or what discrimination could there be when all things were so
completely equal that there was no difference whatever between them?) from
these difficulties there arose worse errors than even those of Aristo. For
his arguments were at all events simple; those of your school are full of
craft.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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