The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
The consideration shown to
the Amir seemed, to the suspicious minds of the Cabulis, a sign which
foreboded his future restoration, or that of his near relatives; and
those who were well inclined to us shrank from declaring their
partisanship too boldly, for fear of after-consequences, when the
Barakzai family should again be all-powerful in the country. There was a
slight dissipation of this feeling when the Proclamation of October 28th
was issued, announcing Yakub Khan’s voluntary abdication, and ordering
all chiefs in Afghanistan to look to the Commander of the British force
at Cabul for their authority in future; but we are known to be so
eccentric a people that there still lurked uneasiness in many minds, and
mouths were sealed that might reasonably have been expected to be open.
The actual presence of the late sovereign in our Camp—even though he was
known to be under a close guard—was too powerful an influence to be
easily swept away: if he had been hurried away to India in disgrace, the
atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty would have cleared up. But our ideas
of justice are too strict to be warped by passionate anger, and it was
resolved to give Yakub Khan as fair a chance of defending himself as he
could possibly expect. That he lost his personal liberty by listening to
foolish councillors, who thought he might gain something by flight, was
nothing to us. One cannot always guard a man against his own stupidity.
Having, then, to keep Yakub Khan with us, we had to do as best we could
in gaining means of judging what were his relations with the men who
stood forth as leaders of the rebel army, and how far he had sympathized
with their plans. In endeavouring to trace out the palace intrigues
which Nek Mahomed, Kushdil Khan, and others had set on foot, the
Commission had often to rely upon men themselves tainted with suspicion;
and when this was the case the statements had to be carefully weighed
and critically compared with facts which were attested beyond doubt. To
dwell, as I have dwelt before, upon the strong point of an Afghan, and
the strongest of a Barakzai—the capacity for lying—would be merely to
repeat an old story: the lies might contain in them a germ of truth
shining out as a silent protest against the mass of falsehood; and many
of these germs have, after careful nursing, borne such fruit, that very
tangible results have been arrived at. In spite of the religious
antipathy always manifested by Mussulmans against Christians, increased
a thousandfold when it is thought a Mussulman’s life is in danger; in
the face of a strong feeling against the restoration of a Barakzai Amir
on the one hand, and of the feudal reverence shown towards the dynasty
on the other; in silent but cautious calculation of those opposing
influences, the Commission felt its way forward. Such men as professed
friendship for us were invited to tell us all they knew, and that _all_
seemed so little that it was disheartening to listen to it; such others
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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