The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
and, thanks to the clemency of the enemy to whom he was opposed, he was
granted terms which, in his position, he could scarcely have hoped to
gain. He allied himself with the most powerful State in Asia, and the
safety of his kingdom was assured against all foreign aggression. If he
had been a tyrant to his subjects, and thoroughly determined to make his
will their law, the reception in his capital of an Embassy from the
Power with which he was allied would have been fraught with no danger
either to himself or to the Ambassador. But he had not the strength of
tyranny sufficient to control the factions of which he was a mere tool,
and it seems only too probable that he gradually drifted from his first
position of sincerity towards his new allies, to that of a timid
spectator of intrigues against the alliance. His weakness and
vacillation could not check the danger that was growing so formidable,
and, when the final outbreak came, his personal influence was even
unequal to saving the life of the man who had trusted so implicitly in
his good faith. That Yakub desired the death of Sir Louis Cavagnari we
do not believe; that he had been led, insidiously, by men about him to
coincide in the view that the Embassy should be forced to leave may be
readily credited. And once that Embassy had been destroyed, there is
only too much reason to suppose that he was inclined to parley with the
men who had brought about its destruction, and to listen to their
plausible reasoning that what had been done was irrevocable. The access
of personal fear, which drove him to seek safety in the British camp, no
more excuses him of responsibility for his acts of omission or
commission, than does the voluntary surrender of a murderer condone the
crime he has committed. So far as human canons are concerned, repentance
cannot blot out guilt, however much it may modify judgment: the supreme
quality of mercy is impossible under ordinary conditions of life. Taking
the most pitiful estimate of Yakub Khan’s offence, putting aside the
idea even of participation in the views of the men who wished him to
break the engagements to which he stood pledged, there is the one
unpardonable crime still clinging to him—that he stood by, and made no
sign, while the lives of men were sacrificed which should have been
sacred to him, even according to the narrow creed of the fanatics who
surrounded him. His own words, when refusing the help that was so dearly
needed, rise up against him when he appeals to our forbearance: “It is
not to be done.” Perhaps, hereafter, the same answer may be given when
we are asked to preserve the integrity of a country which has always
repaid friendship with falsehood, trust with treachery.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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